Anti-Luck Epistemology

Week 3

29., 30.9., 2.10.

When is a belief true not merely by luck?

Pritchard, Epistemology, ch. 2

Nagel, Knowledge, ch. 5 (“Nozick’s tracking theory”)

Anti-Luck Epistemology

Week 3

29., 30.9., 2.10.

When is a belief true not merely by luck?

Pritchard, Epistemology, ch. 2

Nagel, Knowledge, ch. 5 (“Nozick’s tracking theory”)

The Gettier Problem

Week 2

22., 23., 25.9.

Is justified true belief enough for knowledge?

Feldman, Epistemology, ch. 3

Nagel, Knowledge, ch. 4; Gettier, “Is justified true belief knowledge?”; Zagzebski, “The inescapability of Gettier problems”

The Gettier Problem

Week 2

22., 23., 25.9.

Is justified true belief enough for knowledge?

Feldman, Epistemology, ch. 3

Nagel, Knowledge, ch. 4; Gettier, “Is justified true belief knowledge?”; Zagzebski, “The inescapability of Gettier problems”

The Gettier Problem

Week 2

22., 23., 25.9.

Is justified true belief enough for knowledge?

Feldman, Epistemology, ch. 3

Nagel, Knowledge, ch. 4; Gettier, “Is justified true belief knowledge?”; Zagzebski, “The inescapability of Gettier problems”