Sumários
Composite Material Beings (3)
12 Março 2026, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos
Material constitution and the puzzle of the statue and
the clay. Theories that accept co-location of different objects:
four-dimensionalism and the constitution view. (i) Four-dimensionalism:
material objects have temporal parts. Perdurantism and endurantism. Arguments
in favor of four-dimensionalism: answering the problem of temporary intrinsics
(according to which qualitative change seems to violate Leibniz’s law) and
answering Parfit’s problem of personal fission. The proposal: the statue is a
proper part of the lump of clay. The principle that the same parts cannot
compose two different wholes is preserved. It can also explain the difference
in the modal properties of the two co-located objects. An objection: four-dimensionalism
denies the reality of change. (ii) The constitution view: the statue and the
lump of clay are coincident but distinct objects, such that the second
constitutes the first. Formal properties of the constitution relation:
transitive, irreflexive and asymmetric. Mereologically flexible (or ductile)
and mereologically fragile objects. The parthood analysis of constitution. Objections
to the parthood analysis. Wasserman’s deflationary view: there is no constitution,
but only coincidence.
Composite Material Beings (2)
5 Março 2026, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos
The principle of mereological essentialism (defended by Abelard, Leibniz, Moore, Chisholm): parts are essential to their wholes. How can it be reconciled with the numerous commonsensical counter-examples? Ordinary (composite) objects are not fundamental; they are constituted by fundamental objects, which are themselves mereological sums of (their) material parts. Ordinary objects are mereologically flexible (they can be constituted by different objects at different times), but fundamental objects are not. Application to the puzzles. The special composition question and its two extreme answers – nihilism and universalism. Possible intermediate positions: spatial continuity, artifacts and living beings.
Composite Material Beings (1)
26 Fevereiro 2026, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos
Numerical and qualitative identity. Leibniz’s law. Identity and change. Qualitative change and change of composition. Debatable questions: Are all identities permanent and necessary? Can identities be vague?
Four puzzles of material constitution: the debtor’s paradox; the puzzle of Dion and Theon; the puzzle of the ship of Theseus; the puzzle of the statue and the clay. Preliminary discussion of the puzzles.
Truthmakers
19 Fevereiro 2026, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos
Objections to the deflationary theory of truth. Truth-value
gaps (and the corresponding instances of the T-schema). Scientific progress as
gradual approximation to the truth. Wright’s argument against deflationism.
Grounded facts and fundamental facts. Facts about
truth are not fundamental: they require truthmakers. Truthmaking and
necessitation. Truthmaker maximalism. Problematic cases: necessary truths,
negative truths, truths about the past.
Introduction. Truth.
12 Fevereiro 2026, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos
Personal introductions. Aims and contents of the course. Reading list.
Methodology. Assessment of the students will be based on: one oral presentation
in class (30%), one written essay (up to 5,000 words) (60%) on topics
previously agreed and general participation in class. There will be an oral
discussion of the essay.
Theories of truth in contemporary analytic metaphysics. Truth and truthbearers:
propositions. Truth as a property: the search for an analysis. Wright’s assessment
of the traditional debate between the correspondence theory, the coherence theory
and the pragmatist theory. Frege and primitivism. Deflationism: truth is not a
property; truth, disquotation and the central role of T-schema; ‘true’ as a
device of endorsement. Objections to deflationism.