Metaética, 2023/24, S1, FIL2.34805

Docente: David Horst

Course description:

Metaethics is the study of our normative thought and talk: our various ways of evaluating, criticizing, and praising people’s attitudes and actions. A central normative notion—some would say, the fundamental normative notion—is the notion of a reason. When we ask people to justify what they do and think, we ask for their reasons; when they ignore their reasons, we criticize them; when they do and think what they have reasons to do and think, we praise them. But what exactly are reasons? How do they guide our thinking and acting? Do we always have reasons to act morally? What, if any, is the difference between reasons for action and reasons for belief? In this seminar, we tackle these and other questions concerning the nature, role, and scope of reasons. The goal is to introduce students to some of the most important debates surrounding the notion of a reason in contemporary metaethics.

Provisional program:

Reasons: an introduction

·       Types of reasons (normative, motivating, explanatory)

·       Ontology of reasons

Reasons and Motivation

·       Internalism about reasons

·       Externalism about reasons

Morality and Reasons

·       Are there reasons to be moral?

·       Untangling reasons, rationality, and morality

Reasons and Rationality

·       Are there reasons to be rational?

·       Structural vs. substantive rationality

Responding to Reasons

·       Intellectualist conceptions

·       Non-intellectualist conceptions

Wrong Kind of Reasons

·       Wrong vs. right kinds of reasons

·       Skepticism about wrong kind of reasons

Epistemic Reasons

·       Epistemic vs. practical reasons

·       Are there practical reasons for belief?

Evaluation:

1 written exam (30%): 02.11.2023.

1 paper outline (10%): 23.11.2023. The paper outline is a first sketch (500-1000 words) of your final paper for which you will receive feedback from me. The outline can be done in English or Portuguese.

1 final paper (50%): 14.12.2023. The final paper (around 3000 words) is based on your paper outline. In the paper, you are expected to critically discuss one of the articles that we covered in class. The paper is due on the last day of class. The paper can be done in English or Portuguese.

Attendance and Participation (10%).

Bibliography:

All readings will be made available on the course website.

Two good introductions to “reasons-talk”:

·       Alvarez, Maria (2017), "Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (available online: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/)

·       Chapters 1 and 2 from: Parfit, Derek (2011). On What Matters: Volume One. New York: Oxford University Press.

An introduction to how reasons relate to motivation (one of our topics):

·       Finlay, Stephen and Schroeder, Mark (2017), “Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (available online: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-internal-external/)

A selection of other relevant readings:

·       Arpaly, Nomy. (2002). Moral worth. The Journal of Philosophy, 99(5):223–245.

·       Fogal, Daniel & Worsnip, Alex (2021). Which Reasons? Which Rationality? Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.

·       Foot, Philippa (1972). Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives. Philosophical Review 81 (3):305-316.

·       Hieronymi, Pamela (2005). The Wrong Kind of Reason. Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.

·       Markovits, Julia. (2010). Acting for the right reasons. Philosophical Review, 119(2):201–242.

·       Markovits, Julia (2010). Internal reasons and the motivating intuition. In M. Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.

·       McDowell, John (1995). Might There Be External Reasons? In J. E. J. Altham & R. Harrison (eds.), World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge University Press.

·       Parfit, Derek (2011). On What Matters: Volume One. New York: Oxford University Press (ch. 1-2)

·       Scanlon, Thomas (2007). Structural Irrationality. In G. Brennan, R. Goodin, F. Jackson & M. Smith (eds.), Common Minds: Themes From the Philosophy of Philip Pettit. Clarendon Press.

·       Way, Jonathan (2018). Reasons and Rationality. In D. Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.

·       Williams, Bernard (1979). Internal and External Reasons. In R. Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press.

Metaética, 2023/24, S1, FIL2.34805

Docente: David Horst

Course description:

Metaethics is the study of our normative thought and talk: our various ways of evaluating, criticizing, and praising people’s attitudes and actions. A central normative notion—some would say, the fundamental normative notion—is the notion of a reason. When we ask people to justify what they do and think, we ask for their reasons; when they ignore their reasons, we criticize them; when they do and think what they have reasons to do and think, we praise them. But what exactly are reasons? How do they guide our thinking and acting? Do we always have reasons to act morally? What, if any, is the difference between reasons for action and reasons for belief? In this seminar, we tackle these and other questions concerning the nature, role, and scope of reasons. The goal is to introduce students to some of the most important debates surrounding the notion of a reason in contemporary metaethics.

Provisional program:

Reasons: an introduction

·       Types of reasons (normative, motivating, explanatory)

·       Ontology of reasons

Reasons and Motivation

·       Internalism about reasons

·       Externalism about reasons

Morality and Reasons

·       Are there reasons to be moral?

·       Untangling reasons, rationality, and morality

Reasons and Rationality

·       Are there reasons to be rational?

·       Structural vs. substantive rationality

Responding to Reasons

·       Intellectualist conceptions

·       Non-intellectualist conceptions

Wrong Kind of Reasons

·       Wrong vs. right kinds of reasons

·       Skepticism about wrong kind of reasons

Epistemic Reasons

·       Epistemic vs. practical reasons

·       Are there practical reasons for belief?

Evaluation:

1 written exam (30%): 02.11.2023.

1 paper outline (10%): 23.11.2023. The paper outline is a first sketch (500-1000 words) of your final paper for which you will receive feedback from me. The outline can be done in English or Portuguese.

1 final paper (50%): 14.12.2023. The final paper (around 3000 words) is based on your paper outline. In the paper, you are expected to critically discuss one of the articles that we covered in class. The paper is due on the last day of class. The paper can be done in English or Portuguese.

Attendance and Participation (10%).

Bibliography:

All readings will be made available on the course website.

Two good introductions to “reasons-talk”:

·       Alvarez, Maria (2017), "Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (available online: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/)

·       Chapters 1 and 2 from: Parfit, Derek (2011). On What Matters: Volume One. New York: Oxford University Press.

An introduction to how reasons relate to motivation (one of our topics):

·       Finlay, Stephen and Schroeder, Mark (2017), “Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (available online: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-internal-external/)

A selection of other relevant readings:

·       Arpaly, Nomy. (2002). Moral worth. The Journal of Philosophy, 99(5):223–245.

·       Fogal, Daniel & Worsnip, Alex (2021). Which Reasons? Which Rationality? Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.

·       Foot, Philippa (1972). Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives. Philosophical Review 81 (3):305-316.

·       Hieronymi, Pamela (2005). The Wrong Kind of Reason. Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.

·       Markovits, Julia. (2010). Acting for the right reasons. Philosophical Review, 119(2):201–242.

·       Markovits, Julia (2010). Internal reasons and the motivating intuition. In M. Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.

·       McDowell, John (1995). Might There Be External Reasons? In J. E. J. Altham & R. Harrison (eds.), World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge University Press.

·       Parfit, Derek (2011). On What Matters: Volume One. New York: Oxford University Press (ch. 1-2)

·       Scanlon, Thomas (2007). Structural Irrationality. In G. Brennan, R. Goodin, F. Jackson & M. Smith (eds.), Common Minds: Themes From the Philosophy of Philip Pettit. Clarendon Press.

·       Way, Jonathan (2018). Reasons and Rationality. In D. Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.

·       Williams, Bernard (1979). Internal and External Reasons. In R. Harrison (ed.), Rational Action. Cambridge University Press.