Composite Material Beings (2)

6 Março 2025, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

The principle of mereological essentialism (defended by Abelard, Leibniz, Moore, Chisholm): parts are essential to their wholes. How can it be reconciled with the numerous commonsensical counter-examples? Ordinary (composite) objects are not fundamental; they are constituted by fundamental objects, which are themselves mereological sums of (their) material parts. Ordinary objects are mereologically flexible (they can be constituted by different objects at different times), but fundamental objects are not. Application to the puzzles. The special composition question and its two extreme answers – nihilism and universalism. Possible intermediate positions: spatial continuity, artifacts and living beings.

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Composite Material Beings (1)

27 Fevereiro 2025, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

Numerical and qualitative identity. Leibniz’s law. Identity and change. Qualitative change and change of composition. Debatable questions: Are all identities permanent and necessary? Can identities be vague?

Four puzzles of material constitution: the debtor’s paradox; the puzzle of Dion and Theon; the puzzle of the ship of Theseus; the puzzle of that statue and the clay. Preliminary discussion of the puzzles.

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Truth (2)

20 Fevereiro 2025, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

Theories of truth in contemporary analytic metaphysics (cont.). Wright’s analysis of the traditional debate. Arguments against deflationism, against ‘intrinsicism’ and against coherentism. A defense of pluralism about truth.

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Introduction. Truth (1)

13 Fevereiro 2025, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

Personal introductions. Aims and contents of the course. Reading list. Methodology. Assessment of the students will be based on: one oral presentation in class (40%) and one written essay (up to 5,000 words) (60%) on topics previously agreed. There will be an oral discussion of the essay.

Theories of truth in contemporary analytic metaphysics. Russell’s version of the correspondence theory of truth. Elucidating the question "What is truth?". Judgements (or beliefs) as the primary bearers of truth and falsehood. The relation of truth to the mind: a mixture of dependence and independence. Guiding question: is a judgement a relation of the mind with a single object or with several objects? Objections to the dual relation. Russell's multiple relation theory of judgement. Searching for a definition of 'corresponding fact'.

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