Time (3)

4 Maio 2023, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

The growing block theory of time. Characterization of the view and comparison with the other contenders. Main motivation for the growing block: an ontological explanation for the asymmetry in openness between past and future. Discussion of the epistemic objection to the growing block.

 

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Time (2)

27 Abril 2023, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

Presentism as a dynamic theory of time. Its central ontological thesis and accompanying claims. Reply to the triviality complaint. Prominent objections to presentism: (i) singular propositions about wholly past objects; (ii) conflict with the special theory of relativity; (iii) the grounding objection concerning truths about the past.

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Time (1)

20 Abril 2023, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

Eternalism as a static theory of time. Main theses of the theory. Two arguments in support of eternalism: McTaggart’s argument against the A-series and the consequences of Einstein’s special theory of relativity. Problems for eternalism.

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Causation (2)

13 Abril 2023, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

David Lewis’s counterfactual theory of causation. Material and counterfactual conditionals. Truth conditions for counterfactuals in terms of comparative similarity between possible worlds. Analysis of causal dependence between distinct particular (possible and actual) events. Analysis of causation in terms of (chains of) causal dependence. How the theory answers three challenges: to distinguish effects, epiphenomena and preempted potential causes from genuine causes. A problem: is causation transitive?

 

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Causation (1)

30 Março 2023, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

Why is causation important. Hume’s regularity theory of causation. Hume’s negative argument (for the claim that causation is not necessary connection). Hume’s alternative analysis in terms of temporal priority, contiguity and constant conjunction. Hume’s explanation for the mistaken belief that causation involves necessary connection in terms of habit and expectation. Problems for the regularity theory. How to distinguish accidental from causal regularities? How to explain exceptions to causal regularities? How to account for unique case causal relations? Mackie’s analysis of causation in terms of INUS conditions. Critical discussion. An argument to the effect that US (unnecessary but sufficient) conditions are arbitrarily long and never fully specifiable. Skepticism about US conditions.

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