Aesthetics and Emotions

22 Abril 2024, 14:00 • Filipa de Almeida Afonso

3. The Paradox of Fiction and Emotion

3.3. Make-Believe and Quasi-Emotions

3.3.1. The Approach

·       Currie and the attitude of make-belief (i-belief/i-desire)

o   Emotions depend on belief and desire : positive emotions happen when belief and desire harmonise (vs. negative emotions when belief and desire are in tension).

o   Fiction and imaginative counterparts of belief and desire: i-belief/make-believe, i-desire/make-desire.

o   Similarity with real emotions yet differences.

·       The argument of action tendencies

(i)             Emotions involve characteristic action tendencies (fear and fleeing, pity and helping, …).

(ii)            Emotions towards fiction do not involve the characteristic action tendencies;

                        (C)  Therefore, they are quasi-emotions (or involve i-belief/i-desire).

3.3.2. Discussion

3.3.2.1. The argument of action tendencies

Ø  How to discuss an argument?

Ø  Is i) true? Do all emotions involve action tendencies?

Ø  Is ii) true? Aren’t there action tendencies in fiction?

Ø  Do i) and ii) entail the conclusion?

☒      Contra i: Not all types of emotions have action tendencies: Emotions about the past (regret), Emotions towards distant event/person.

☒     Contra i: Emotions towards fiction are directed at representations of events (vs. events; Matravers 1998).

•       Documentaries, newspapers, …: representations of events

•       No action tendency because representations of events. Still real emotions: sad watching a documentary about the Holocaust.

☒     Contra ii: Emotions about fiction can involve action tendencies (interactive fictions: video-games, virtual reality).

3.3.2.2. Disanalogies with make-believe: Control

•       Make-belief is under direct voluntary control.

•       Refuse/stop to play the game

•       Opt/start to play the game

☒     Emotions about fiction aren’t under direct voluntary control.

•       Can’t refuse to be horrified while watching The Exorcist.

•       Inept fictional works: make-believe doesn’t elicit fear (example of trailer)

3.3.2.2. Disanalogies: Phenomenology

•       Make belief and pretend emotion: fake emotions.

Ø  Fiction: fake emotions?

3.3.2.3. I-desires ?

v  There is no need to appeal to i-desire (sui generis imaginative analogue of desire).

v  Role of i-desire can be played by proper desire.

 

3.3.           Emotion, Thought and Imagination

3.4.1. The dominant approach : Denying the Belief Requirement

v  To have an emotion towards x, it is sufficient to entertain the thought that x exists (Carroll1990) or imagine x (Novitz 1980).

·       Glass Platform (fear without belief): Emotions without belief: reflex-like

·       Phobia (fear without evaluative belief): Emotion without belief in evaluative properties (danger)

·       Vivid imagination of one’s lover death, sexual fantasy: Emotion based on imagination/thoughts (vs. belief)

·       Moran (1994): Emotional responses to non-actuality, for instance modal facts (things that might have happened but didn’t) and past: relief, disappointment, regret.

3.4.2. Lamarque : Thought Theory

v  Emotions about fiction are elicited by thoughts: “mentally represent” (Lamarque), “entertain in thought” (Carroll) or “imaginatively propose” (Smith)

•       Fictional characters as thought-contents characterized by descriptions

v  The real objects of our fear in fictional cases are thoughts.

Ø  What is the content of the emotion? Thought content (senses of description; psychological)

☒     Walton 1990: "Oh, that poor thought content!"

3.4.3.       Disanalogies with examples (Glass Platform, Phobia)

Ø  Are emotions towards fiction analogous to these cases? Still existential commitment (vs. fiction)

☞    Snake and precipice exist

☞    Situation could happen (considered as real possibility)

☞    Motivations to act

☒     Phobic emotions are irrational vs. Fiction

3.4.4.       Radford’s Challenge

Ø  Why is mere thought/imagining sufficient to elicit the emotion towards fiction?

(1)   Emotional reactions outside fiction typically recede once we learn that their objects do not exist.

(2)   If emotions do not vanish in such circumstances, they are “unwarranted” or “unfitting.”

(C)   These phenomena are best explained by the Belief Requirement: To feel genuine emotions, we must believe that these emotions are directed to existing objects.

☛     Incoherence between fiction and non-fiction case. The case of fictosexuality.

 

3.5.    The Normative Challenge

3.5.1. Moral sensitivity

v  Fictional emotions are rational: They play a role in moral character (Aristotle 1984; Feagin 1983; Nussbaum 1986, 1990).

☛     Emotions in response to fiction are rational: socially adaptive, getting us to identify and sympathize with other people (Robinson 2005).

•       Actual experience: limited range of encounters vs. Fiction broadens our range of simulated encounters (insights about others’ experiences).

3.5.2. Simulated emotions

v  Gendler & Kovakovich 2006: Emotions towards fiction are simulated emotions, and simulated emotions play an important role in rationality.

§  Decision-making:

•       Phineas Gage: Individuals with damage to their ventromedial prefrontal cortex (reduced emotional sensitivity) are unable to make optimal decision.

v  Damasio 1996, Bechara 2005: Optimal/Rational decisions involve simulated emotions towards various courses of action (gut feelings intelligence).

☛     Emotions towards what is known to be non-actual are part of rational decision-making.

☞     Same with fiction: if fine for decision, fine for fiction.

3.5.3.       Norms for fiction

v  Friend 2010, Gilmore 2011: Fictions are subject to norms, which make emotions towards fiction appropriate.

v  Friend 2010: An emotion is fictionally correct = The associated evaluation accurately represents the fictional situation (justified in light of fictional information and genre, etc.).

 

4.        The Emotional Power of Music

 

4.1. Music and Emotion

•       Emotion perception (perceiving emotions)

•       We perceive emotions (e.g. sadness) in music.

•       We perceive music as expressive of emotions (e.g. sadness).

☞     Absolute music (without lyrics).

·       What does that mean?

·       Emotion induction (feeling emotions)

·       Music elicits emotions.

·       Music makes us feel, say, sad.

·       Frissons, goosebumps, tears, pleasure, etc.

·       Musical contagion:

·       Emotion felt = Emotion perceived

Ø  How could music elicit emotions?

Ø  Does music really make us feel, say, sad?

·       Significance: the value of music, the role of music in culture and moral character

4.2. Perceiving Emotions: Musical Expressiveness

·       Live experiment: which emotions does the music express and why?

4.2.1. Empirical results

§  Inter-personal convergence in perception of emotions: Associations music-emotion are systematic, at least for basic emotions (sadness, joy, fear, anger, tenderness) and general categories. Less convergence for complex emotions (e.g. jealousy) and specific categories.

§  Universality? Robustness: marginal impact of musical competence, age and gender. Early development. Cross-cultural studies. Some associations are cultural (mode).

§  Expressiveness in performance: similar results.

§  Acoustic profile of emotions expressed.

§  Mechanisms:

§  Affective prosody: music sounds like the way people talk when they express some emotion. The case of sad music and sad speech.

§  Movement: music sounds like the way people walk when they have an emotion.

4.2.2. Philosophical theories

·       The Issue: can music really express emotions? After all, music is non-sentient, hence has no emotion it can express. Is it a metaphorical way of talking?

4.2.2.1. Two dead ends

·       Conventions? Conventions are important but are not all there is. The problem of robustness and of phenomenology.

·       Artistic intentions? Expression theory (Tolstoy, Collingwood, Croce): the artist feels and expresses an emotion by composing/performing music.

o   Not necessary: one may compose a sad song without feeling sad.

o   Not sufficient: one may intend to express some emotion but fail (a clumsy artist composes happy music while one wanted to express sadness)

·       Expressiveness in the music itself.

·       4 main philosophical theories

4.2.2.2. Arousal Theory

v  AROUSAL: Music expresses emotion E = Music induces emotion E in listeners under appropriate circumstances (e.g. sadness; Robinson 2005, Matravers 2012, Cochrane 2017)

☒     Not necessary: Musical critic and cold appreciation (Bouwswa 2001). Perception vs. Feeling emotion

☒     Sad music: Why would one enjoy sad music if it makes one feel sad? (Davies 2011).

 

4.2.2.3. Resemblance/Contour Theory

v  CONTOUR THEORY: Music expresses emotion E = Music resembles the expression of emotion E (Budd 1995, Davies 1994, Kivy 1989, Davies 2011).

§  Expressiveness and emotional appearances

o   San Bernards and basset hounds.

o   Physiognomic perception: weeping willow.

§  Not necessary: Complex and “cognitive” emotions (Robinson & Hatten 2012)

o   Hope, gratitude, nostalgia: absence of expressive/behavioral characteristic profile

 

4.2.2.4. Imagination

v  PERSONA THEORY: Music expresses emotion E = Listeners imagine a person who feels the emotion E (Levinson 1998).

☒     Not necessary: We do not always imagine a person/story (basic musical perception; Robinson 2016).

☒     Freedom (Davies 2003)

v  Imagination is free.

v  Literature, film: art work guides imaginings.

·       Music? Indeterminacy/abstract.

 

4.2.2.5. Metaphor Experience

²  We describe music in metaphorical terms (space-time, movement, color, …) because musical experience is metaphorical (Scruton 1997).

v  METAPHOR: Music expresses emotion E = Listeners perceive music metaphorically-as E (Peacocke 2014, 2020; Lauria 2023)

v  Sad music = Music perceived metaphorically-as sad.

G  Cognitive metaphor theory: Metaphors are not just poetic/linguistic entities; they are ways of thinking/experiencing the world, which are often based in sensori-motor experiences (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Johnson 2010).

 

4.2.2.6. Atmospheres: Expressiveness as atmosphere (Griffero 2019)/emotional appearance (Benenti 2020).

 

4.3. Feeling Emotions: Music-Elicited Emotions

·       Music elicits various emotions. Various factors (musical, personal, context) are relevant.

·       Music elicits emotions through various mechanisms: reflex, imagery, memory, expectations, etc.

·       In contagion, the emotion felt corresponds to the emotion perceived (e.g. sadness in response to sad music). Emotion is felt because we perceive the same emotion in music.

·       Contagion: musical, social, physiognomic.

·       What is musical contagion?

·       COGNITIVISM: Emotions are representations of values (good/bad, positive/negative; de Sousa 1987, Mulligan 1998, Goldie 2000, Tappolet 2000, Scherer et al. 2001, Roberts 2003, Prinz 2004, Deonna & Teroni 2012).

·       Melanie is afraid of birds: Physiological changes, desire to flee, vocal and facial expressions, ...

·       She’s afraid because she evaluates the birds as dangerous/threatening.

·       Feeling sad is experiencing something unfortunate, negative event (loss, bad news, drama).

·       Contagion is a counter-example to cognitivism.

·       According to cognitivism, when sad music makes you feel sad, you evaluate the music as unfortunate (e.g. bad news, loss, …). However, this is wrong. Nothing bad happened!

·       Is cognitivism wrong? Are there ways to rescue it?

·       Moods, being moved, and imagination as main ways to rescue it.

·       Non-cognitivism as main approach to musical contagion: music infects us automatically (mimicry) without the resort to cognitive evaluation.otions (or involve i-belief/i-desire).

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Aesthetics and Emotions

15 Abril 2024, 14:00 • Filipa de Almeida Afonso

. Aesthetic Emotions and Experience

 

Summary and dialectic.

 

2.4. The Content View (Carroll)

2.4.1.       The View

v  CONTENT VIEW: Aesthetic experience is paying attention to form, expressive properties, aesthetic properties, or interactions between them.

v  Attention to these properties makes an experience aesthetic (and relation between properties and attention/awareness).

☞     Form: ensemble of choices intended to realize the purpose of work; design, point of the work

☞     Expressive and aesthetic properties: anthropomorphism, joy/sadness in music; sublimity massive statue, buoyancy of dancers, smoothness

☞     Attention to either formal, or aesthetic, or expressive properties is sufficient for counting the experience aesthetic. If you are in one of the preceding mental states, your experience is aesthetic.

 

2.4.2.       Advantages towards the Valuing View

•       Compatible with (mere) instrumental valuing of aesthetic experience.

•       Compatible with negative and indifferent aesthetic experiences

•       Aesthetic education: instruct others by telling them what to attend to in the pertinent artworks.

 

2.4.3.       Unity

v  Artworks have points or purposes: to advance a theme or a point of view, or to elicit a state.

v  The formal, aesthetic, and expressive dimensions of artworks are elements in the way in which the artwork is embodied /means by which the purposes of the work are realized.

v  Aesthetic experiences involve focus upon the how of the work, the way in which the artwork is embodied or presented (à la Danto 1997: art works as embodied meanings).

 

2.4.4.       Beyond fine art

·       Applied arts : form and function

·       Nature : apparent teleology and expressive/aesthetic properties

 

2.4.5.       Morality and aesthetics

Ø  Is morality part of the aesthetic experience?

v  Devereaux: Expanding aesthetics to moral and scientific dimensions

v  Carroll: A moral defect in an artwork can count as an aesthetic defect.

·       A work is aesthetically defective if it fails to embody the point of the work.

·       Arousal of emotions as the point or purpose of many artworks, which is moral (tragedy and pity, empathy, etc.).

 

2.4.6.       The problem of sufficiency: descriptive (Levinson)

☒     Attending to formal/aesthetic properties is not sufficient for aesthetic experience.

•       Mediocre art/ordinary landscape: Mediocrity may preclude aesthetic mindset; Chaotic and ungraspable form

•       Noticing formal and aesthetic features is pervasive, but aesthetic experience is not that common!

•       Attention to form and aesthetic properties underlie our appreciating such works, but are not aesthetic experiences.

☞     Affective response is missing.

 

2.4.7.       The problem of sufficiency: normative (Levinson)

•       We value aesthetic experience of art works. Aesthetic experience is rewarding / worthwhile.

☒     Attending to form and aesthetic properties does not capture our interest in artworks (vs. affect, pleasure, appreciation views).

☒     The natural world and human-made world outside of art is full of forms and aesthetic properties.

Ø  Why would we value art and our experience of art?

 

2.5.    Aesthetic Appreciation

 

2.5.1.       Levinson on aesthetic appreciation

v  Aesthetic experience = two components

1)     Aesthetic perception of some object, grounded in aesthetic attention to the object (for its own sake),

2)     in which there is a positive hedonic, affective, or evaluative response to the perception or the content of that perception.

·       What most art aims at: aesthetic appreciation.

·       Sexual and psychedelic experiences sometimes count as aesthetic experience (not always).

 

2.5.2.       Robinson on aesthetic emotions as emotions of appreciation

•       Formalism: Form vs. content

o   Clive Bell, 1914, visual art works: Aesthetic emotion is emotion about significant form

o   Significant form: Relations and combination of lines and colors

o   Formalism: (good) art work does not depend on content but on the way content is presented

☒      Content matters too and influences perception of form.

☒      Interrelationships of forms express, convey, or communicate content.

v  Aesthetic emotions are emotions of appreciation.

§  Attention to intrinsic qualities and interplay between form and content (non-utilitarian).

§  Pleasurable emotions and positive evaluation of art work.

 

2.6.    Conclusion

Ø  What are we talking about? Aesthetic emotion, aesthetic attitude, aesthetic experience, aesthetic appreciation. Are they the same? How do they relate to each other?

·       Main theories: disinterest, valuing view, content view, appreciation vies

 

3.        The Paradox of Fiction and Emotion

 

3.0. Introducing the issue

·       Up, love, grief, and the meaning of life. Why are we so moved? After all, these characters do not exist.

·       Radford and Anna Karenina: How can we be moved by the fate of Anna Karenina? There is literally, nothing to be concerned about, no one to pity. And we know that.

·       Walton and Charles: Charles is afraid while watching a horror movie. But there’s nothing to be afraid about: no danger, threat, … And we know that.

 

3.1. Formulating the paradox of fiction

§  Three inconsistent and plausible propositions.

1)     FICTIONAL EMOTIONS: We feel emotions towards fictional characters and situations.

2)     BELIEF REQUIREMENT: In order to feel an emotion towards x, we must believe that x exists/is real.

3)     FICTIONAL BELIEF: We do not believe that the fictional characters and situations are real/exist.

☞    Inconsistency.

 

1)     FICTIONAL EMOTIONS: We feel emotions towards fictional characters and situations.

     Physiological responses (heartbeat, respiration rate, ...)

     Phenomenal character

     Emotional expressions (crying, screaming, ….)

     Enjoyment and value of fiction

 

3)   FICTIONAL BELIEF: We do not believe that the fictional characters and situations are real/exist.

     Lack of action tendencies!

 

2)     BELIEF REQUIREMENT: In order to feel an emotion towards x, we must believe that x exists/is real.

·       Problem isn’t inexistence (Currie 1998) : Emotions about the future (looking forward to x), Emotions based on false belief (angry at Mary insulting you)

·       Problem is belief about inexistence (or absence of belief about existence).

·       Emotions about things we believe are fully inexistent are impossible or, at least, irrational.

            Looking forward to Santa Claus’s visit                     Grieving my imaginary friend

            Falling in love with an avatar        

·       Belief update (Radford): Real/Fake vs. Unreal events.

·       Ceasing to believe in reality of the content of the emotion extinguishes the emotion.

 

BELIEF REQUIREMENT: In order to feel an emotion towards x, we must believe that x exists/is real and instantantiates some relevant property (values: suffering, danger, …).

·       Fear and danger.

·       Pity and misfortune/suffering.

·       Emotions and values (formal objects; DeSousa, Tappolet).

 

§  Descriptive challenge: Emotions towards fiction are impossible.

§  Normative challenge: Emotions towards fiction are irrational/inappropriate.

§  What is fiction? The basic mistakes (narration, falsity) and the importance of make-believe/pretense

 

3.2. Dead ends or implausible solutions

What are the strategies?

v  Deny 1): We do not feel emotions towards fictional characters/events.

A.    We do not feel emotions but moods/non-cognitive affective responses.

B.     We feel emotions but not towards fictional characters/events. The emotions are directed towards the real situation corresponding to the fictional scenario.

A.     Do we only feel moods or non-cognitive affective responses? Not always. Not just startle reflex.

B.     Do we feel counterpart emotions, i.e. emotions directed towards the real situations? Sometimes, but not always: not always possible, not true to phenomenology, disanalogy between emotion in real life and emotion in fictional scenario (evil characters).

 

v  Deny 3): We temporarily believe in the existence of fictional characters (immersion). The problem of action tendencies and of enjoyment of negative art.

 

3.3.           Make-Believe and Quasi-Emotions

·       Walton and games of make-believe:

☞     in children games of make-believe (pretending to be a monster), one is not really afraid. It is make-believe that one is afraid.

☞     Likewise, in fiction, one does not feel real fear/pity. It is make-believe that one feels these emotions (quasi-emotions, pretense emotions).

 

·       Currie and the attitude of make-belief (i-belief/i-desire)

o   Emotions depend on belief and desire : positive emotions happen when belief and desire harmonise (vs. negative emotions when belief and desire are in tension).

o   fiction and imaginative counterparts of belief and desire: i-belief/make-believe, i-desire/make-desire

o   Similarity with real emotions yet differences

 

·       The argument of action tendencies

                                                             i.         Emotions involve characteristic action tendencies (fear and fleeing, pity and helping, …).

                                                           ii.         Emotions towards fiction do not involve the characteristic action tendencies;

(C)  Therefore, they are quasi-emotions (or involve i-belief/i-desire).

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Aesthetics and Emotions

8 Abril 2024, 14:00 • Filipa de Almeida Afonso

Dear Filipa,

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Aesthetics and Emotions

1 Abril 2024, 14:00 • Filipa de Almeida Afonso

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Aesthetics and Emotions

18 Março 2024, 14:00 • Filipa de Almeida Afonso

0.     Who are we ? Geographical, intellectual, and aesthetic background

1.     The topic: The emotional power of art and of aesthetics

1.1.           Exploration of examples: fine arts, applied arts, and nature

1.2.           Aesthetic emotions are emotions.

§  What are emotions? Examples

§  Tentative theories: reactions, relations, propositional attitudes, occurrent or episodic states, …

§  Exploration of the affective repertoire and terminology: valence (positive, negative, mixed feelings), importance of negative emotions concepts, emotions vs. sentiments, …

§  Four facets/paradigmatic features of emotions/affective states

§  Phenomenal character: valence, unconscious emotions?

§  Physiological changes: emotions and bodily changes

§  Emotional expressions: facial expressions (the kinds of smiles, the function of tears), vocal expressions (affective prosody), bodily posture

§  Action tendencies: emotions typically motivate us to act.

§  Back to aesthetic emotions: Aesthetic emotions share the four paradigmatic features of emotions, hence they are emotions.

§  Complications: Are all aesthetic emotions really emotions?

§  Fiction: Emotions usually require the belief in the existence of their content or the belief that their content happened (sadness: belief that something sad happened). At least, rational emotions require this belief; emotions vanish when the belief is abandoned (example of nightmare and fear). However, emotions towards fiction do not involve the belief that their content exists. One feels sad for Anna Karenina, although one knows that she doesn’t exist and that nothing bad happened. Strange. Are we really feeling emotions towards fiction then?

§  Music: Emotions usually involve cognitive evaluations. For instance, one feels sad because one evaluates a situation as unfortunate/bad news. Now, music contaminates us: for instance, sad music may make one feel sad. In that case, one does not evaluate the situation as unfortunate/bad news. Nothing bad happened. Strange. Does music really elicit emotions then?

1.3.           Aesthetic emotions are aesthetic (vs. non-aesthetic) emotions.

§  Aesthetic vs. Utilitarian emotions (personal goal; e.g. fear)

§  Aesthetic vs. Moral emotions (e.g. contempt)

§  Aesthetic vs. Political emotions (e.g. indignation)

§  Aesthetic vs. Epistemic emotions (e.g. curiosity)

§  Some emotions are inherently aesthetic (e.g. feeling of beauty)

§  Some emotion kinds can be aesthetic or not (e.g. being moved)

1.4.           The main issues: What are aesthetic emotions? Why are they important?

1.5.           Significance: aesthetics, social life, well-being (emotion regulation with art, monitoring arousal levels, the paradox of sad music or why do people listen to sad music especially when they feel sad)

1.6.           What we did: Writing the introduction of the essay

1.7.           Delineating the issues into 6 specific problems

1.8.           Goal of the module and online resources

1.9.           Homework: What are aesthetic emotions?

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