Sumários

The data of philosophical arguments

16 Fevereiro 2024, 09:30 Delia Belleri


Weinberg, Jonathan M. ; Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen (2001). Normativity and epistemic intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.

Epistemic Romanticism
Intuition-Driven Romanticism

The Normativity Problem
Cultural variations: Nisbett and Haidt

Hypothesis 1: Epistemic intuitions vary from culture to culture.
Hypothesis 2: Epistemic intuitions vary from one socioeconomic group to another.

Comparing Ws, EAs, and SCs
TruetempCases
Gettier Cases
Comparing different SES

Doubts on Intuition-Driven Romanticism
Objections and replies

The data of philosophical arguments

9 Fevereiro 2024, 09:30 Delia Belleri


Gettier cases and the use of intuitions

Close reading of:
Gettier, E. L. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis, 23(6), 121–123.
Goldman, A. I. (1967). A causal theory of knowing. Journal of Philosophy, 64(12), 357–372.

The data of philosophical arguments

6 Fevereiro 2024, 09:30 Delia Belleri


Analysis in analytic philosophy
  • Analysis as decomposition
  • Analysis as paraphrase
  • Analysis as elucidation
  • Analysis as construction (explication)
The Paradox of Analysis
  • Informativeness and synonymity are mutually exclusive
  • Decomposition-and paraphrase conceptions are affected by the paradox

Philosophy and the sciences

2 Fevereiro 2024, 09:30 Delia Belleri


Sellars: the manifest image vs. the scientific image

Reading and in-class discussion of the text: Sellars, W. 1991. ‘Philosophy and the scientific image of man’, Science, Perception and Reality. Atascadero: Ridgeview.

Philosophy and the sciences

30 Janeiro 2024, 09:30 Delia Belleri


Philosophy and the sciences

The sciences progress, philosophy does not progress
Examples and counterexamples

Naturalism
Hard and soft naturalism
Ontological vs. Methodological naturalism
Wittgenstein rejects methodological naturalism

Sellars: the manifest vs. the scientific image
Parallel, irreducible descriptions: they have toco-exist

Philosophy as ‘humanistic’
Inquiry from first vs. third person perspectives