Sumários
Assessment - III
10 Maio 2022, 09:30 • António José Teiga Zilhão
Oral Presentations (cont.):
4. João Miranda: 'Is There a Role for General Rules in Inductive Inferences?'
5. Youssef Aguisoul: 'Do Predictions derive from Explanations?'
6. Henrique de Matos: 'Does the Duhem-Quine Thesis 'falsify' Falsifiability?'
7. Katharina Jakob: 'Does Popper's Principle of Falsification really account for the way Science works?'
8. Margarida Moreira: 'É legítimo inferir de poucos casos o mesmo que inferimos de muitos casos numa inferência indutiva?'
Assessment - II
3 Maio 2022, 09:30 • António José Teiga Zilhão
Oral Presentations:
1) Charlotte Fossaert - Is Abduction reliable as a Logic of Discovery?
2) Gabriel Malagutti - Are Testifiers reliable?
3) Inés Pérez - Is there a strong inductive solution to the problem of other animal minds?
McTaggart's Paradox: Obscure or Misunderstood?
26 Abril 2022, 09:30 • António José Teiga Zilhão
Lecture by Prof. Rognvaldur Ingthorsson (Univ. of Helsinki - Finland) titled McTaggart's Paradox: Obscure or Misunderstood?
The Problem of Induction - 8
19 Abril 2022, 09:30 • António José Teiga Zilhão
The Material Theory of Induction
1. The main theses of John Norton's material theory of induction:
Thesis 1 - There are no universally legitimate schemes of inductive inference.
Thesis 2 - The legitimacy of any inductive inference is to be justified locally and by the appeal to matters of fact only.
Thesis 3 - The local and material nature of inductive inferences explains away Hume's problem of justification: there is no need to find an independent justification for universal inferential schemes that are inexistent.
2. Consideration of some examples illustrating Norton's theses.
3. Norton's Material Theory of Induction and Goodman's New Riddle of Induction
3.1. Norton agrees with Goodman that an appeal to uniformity in order to justify inductive inference remains ineffective until a justification for the structure of the systems of predicates involved is provided.
3.2. Norton disagrees with Goodman's attempt at finding universal rules of projectibility for the legitimizing of any system of predicates.
3.3. Norton claims that the legitimacy of any system of predicates is to be decided locally also, i.e., it is to be decided within particular domains of research and on the basis of specific matters of fact.