Sumários
The Causal Argument for Identity - seminar discussion
4 Março 2026, 11:00 • David Yates
Discussion of the well-known causal argument for physicalism based on the efficacy of the mental, the causal closure of the physical, and the causal exclusion principle. Discussion based on set readings listed in the previous topic.
The Identity Theory of Mind
2 Março 2026, 11:00 • David Yates
This week we will examine several arguments for the identification of mental states with brain states, all of them based in some way on mental causation. As we will see, early identity theorists were concerned with the meanings of mental terms, and started by arguing that it is a priori that mental concepts are associated with certain causal descriptions. In Smart's paper (below) this semantic analysis is part of what explains how the identity theory could be both true and a posteriori. Modern identity theory dispenses with logical analysis and just focuses on the empirical fact (if it is a fact) that mental states are part of the causal nexus. However, one crucial respect in which modern identity theorists agree with Smart is this: mental concepts do not reveal the essences of mental states. However we are thinking about our own mental states, including our conscious states, we are not thinking of them in terms of their true essential natures. If we already knew the true natures of conscious states, it's very hard to see how they could turn out to be brain states...
Reading: J. J. C. Smart, 'Sensations and Brain Processes', in Chalmers (ed.) pp. 60-68.
Alternative reading is this clear and short introduction to causal arguments for the identity theory:
A. Horowitz, 'The argument from mental causation for physicalism'
Logical Behaviourism - seminar discussion
25 Fevereiro 2026, 11:00 • David Yates
Continuation of the previous topic, including explanation of Dennett's intentional systems theory and the form of behaviourism that results from his views. Discussion of the set papers listed in the previous topic.
Logical Behaviourism
23 Fevereiro 2026, 11:00 • David Yates
This week we will examine logical behaviourism, and Putnam's attempted refutation of it. We will examine epistemological arguments for behaviourism based on our knowledge of other minds (due to Ryle and Malcolm), and based on our knowledge of the meanings of mental terms (Wittgenstein's private language argument). We will then examine the sophisticated form of logical behaviourism endorsed by Dennett (interpretationism), and finally examine how Putnam's thought experiment undermines behaviourism in all its forms.
Reading for this week is pp. 45-50 of Putnam's classic paper, Brains and Behaviour. This is available in Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. It is also well worth taking a look at some excerpts from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (available in the Readings folder). Check out paragraphs 293-298 and 243-271.
Further reading
If you find the idea of the intentional stance interesting and want to read Dennett, the following papers are highly recommended:
Dennett, D. 'True Believers' in Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings
Dennett, D. Real Pattens. Journal of Philosophy 1991.
For more on what exactly counts as behaviour, and in particular on what Dennett takes behaviour to be, see:
Cartesian dualism - mental causation
11 Fevereiro 2026, 11:00 • David Yates
A discussion session on the problems of mental causation for dualists - including a priori problems relating to the overall coherence of Descartes' position and a posteriori problems relating to clashes between dualism and scientific principles such as the conservation of energy. Consideration of potential dualist responses to all these problems.