Sumários
The phenomenal concepts strategy
25 Março 2026, 11:00 • David Yates
Recap of the main points of the zombie argument; introduction to phenomenal concepts and the way in which physicalists use them to respond to Kripke's challege (why do we seem to be able to imagine ZW if it's not genuinely possible?)
Kripke's Zombie Argument
23 Março 2026, 11:00 • David Yates
This week we will consider the Zombie argument for property dualism about consciousness. This argument takes its inspiration from Descartes' meditation VI, in which he argues from the fact that he can clearly and distinctly imagine mind and body being separate to the conclusion that they are therefore separable by God, and distinct. Instead of conceiving the complete separation of mind and body, however, the zombie argument just requires us to conceive a physical duplicate of ourselves that has no conscious states. As we will see, it is very hard to deny that zombies are at least in some sense conceivable, and this fact gives rise to the explanatory gap between consciousness and the physical. The zombie argument and the problem of absent qualia for functionalism are very closely connected: zombies are exact physical duplicates with no consciousness, whereas the absent qualia problem involves exact functional (but not physical) duplicates with no consciousness.
Reading:
Amy Kind - Chalmers Conceivability Argument
Please note, the Zombie argument has its source in the work of Saul Kripke, so the title of the above article is a little misleading! For the original, please see:
Saul Kripke - Naming and Necessity, excerpt in Chalmers, pp. 329-33.
Physicalist Replies to the Knowledge Argument - Seminar
18 Março 2026, 11:00 • David Yates
Discussion of the set readings, focusing on three possible physicalist responses to the knowledge argument: Dennett's "blue banana trick" thought experiment, Lewis' ability hypothesis, and the New-Knowledge / Old-Fact reply favoured by most physicalist (Horgan, Levine, Papineau, etc.)
The Knowledge Argument
16 Março 2026, 11:00 • David Yates
This week we will begin to look at the notorious knowledge argument due to Nagel and Jackson, which - like the zombie argument - aims to show that consciousness is not a physical or functional phenomenon. Could you know all of the physical facts about a brain process without knowing what it is like to undergo that process? If so, what are the consequences for physicalism? Must there be irreducibly subjective facts in addition to the objective facts that are the domain of physical sciences? We will examine two forms of the knowledge argument against physicalism, and proceed to study the ways in which physicalists have responded to it.
You should read at least these short summaries of the arguments due to Nagel and Jackson:
Amy Kind - Nagel's what is it like to be a bat argument
Brie Gertler - The knowledge argument
Here are the original articles, both of which are to be found in Chalmers:
Nagel, 'What is it like to be a bat?', pp. 219-225
Jackson, 'Epiphenomenal Qualia', pp. 273-280
Functionalism and absent qualia - seminar discussion
11 Março 2026, 11:00 • David Yates
For the absent qualia objection to functionalism that we will be discussing in the lectures, see 'Troubles with Functionalism' (excerpt), by Ned Block, pp. 94-98 in Chalmers.
To help you read the Block paper, here are some clarifications:
- Functionalism in general: the idea that mental states are defined by their abstract causal organization, and not at the level of the specific physical states that realize that organization.
- In the Block paper, "Functionalism" = a version of functionalism in which the causal organization that defines mental states is given by folk psychology, the common-sense theory we use to explain and predict each other, and which we all possess.
- Block uses "psychofunctionalism" to refer to a version of functionalism where the causal organization is given in terms of scientific psychology, and so is not available a priori to the "folk".