Sumários
Seminar discussion on the Chinese Room argument
22 Abril 2026, 11:00 • David Yates
Reading:
For the original presentation of the Chinese Room argument, see Searle's paper 'Minds, Brains and Programs' (this is the original paper with open peer commentaries), or 'Is the brain's mind a computer program?' (a simpler and more informal look at classical computationalism and its problem in accounting for meaning, with a statement of the argument from Searle's original paper plus Searle's responses to his main critics).
Useful encyclopaedia entries
IEP entry on the Chinese Room (recommended)
The classical computational theory of mind
20 Abril 2026, 11:00 • David Yates
From this week onwards, we will focus on theories of cognition and representation. We will start with the classical computational theory of mind (CCTM), which was the dominant paradigm in AI research until the 1990s. We will then examine the language of thought model (Fodor) which is a specific version of CCTM that says that computational processes operate at the level of concents and not just at the level of entire thoughts. In the Wednesday class, we will study Searle's Chinese Room argument that computational accounts of mind are purely formal and syntactic, whereas minds are essentially semantic (have meaningful states). We will briefly examine two responses to the Chinese Room argument (the systems reply and the robot reply) and consider their implications for the nature of mind and cognition. We will return to these replies next week.
Seminar discussion on panpsychism based on set readings
15 Abril 2026, 11:00 • David Yates
Reading
C. D. Broad 'Mechanism and its Alternatives', excerpt in Chalmers, pp. 106-115.
For an argument for panpsychism that is based in part on rejection of Broad's emergentism, see:
G. Strawson, 'Realistic Monism'
Emergentism vs. panpsychism
13 Abril 2026, 11:00 • David Yates
This week we will consider two alternative anti-reductionist approaches to consciousness: emergentism and panpsychism. Emergentists hold that consciousness is causally linked to brain activity and emerges according to irreducible and fundamental bridge-laws from complex brain processes. This is the kind of emergent property dualism Smart argues against in his paper on the identity theory. Panpsychists think that consciousness can in principle be explained in terms of the brain, but only because the fundamental particles that make up complex brain states have irreducible proto-phenomenal properties. On this view, brains are conscious because they are composed of (proto) conscious fundamental particles.