Sumários

module Language (3)

15 Novembro 2022, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

We had overviewed basic notions (singular/general terms, truth condition/truth values, propositions, analyticity, apriority, necessity, and possible worlds).

We then moved to discuss Kripke's criticism to Descriptivism (semantic, epistemic and modal arguments) and introduced rigidity.

module A: Mind (5)

8 Novembro 2022, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

1. The intentionality of pain

1.1. The bodily damage view: summary and problems

1.2. The mode of hurting view: the problem of pain asymbolia

1.3. Evaluativism

Two claims (Bain): Pain as perception of bodily condition. Unpleasant pain as perception of bodily condition as bad/harmful

Advantages of the view: felt location, intensity, affective character, pain asymbolia

The problem of motivation: Why shoot the messenger?

The problem of accuracy conditions: When is pain incorrect? Individual differences and weak correlations with bodily damage.

The problem of other bodily feelings: How do itches represent the body?

1.4. Imperativism

Descriptive vs. Imperative content

Hull: the content of itches is "Scratch it!".

Klein: pain and proscriptive or protective command ("Don't do that!" vs. "Protect this body part!")

Pure and impure imperativism (Martinez): various imperative content

Advantages: satisfaction vs. correctness of orders, imperatives and motivation

The problem of pains that do not motivate: phantom pain

The problem of pains that do not motivate: pain asymbolia

The problem of motivation and authority

Does imperative content capture the phenomenal character of pain?

2. The intentionality of moods

The pervasive role of moods

Are moods intentional? What is the content of moods?

2.1. Moods are not intentional

Diffuse phenomenology and linguistic reports

Moods vs. Emotions: Emotions are directed at particular things and situations (vs. moods are not about anything)

2.2. The Global Content View

Moods are about the world in general. General content explains diffuse phenomenology.

Describing the content of moods: the world as whole is F, things are F (F: evaluative properties, such as wonderful, menacing, ...)

The problem of identified objects: The Unidentified Object View (Rossi)

The problem of modes: "things are F" can be the content of beliefs and any attitude. The Mode view (Kriegel)

2.3. Are moods really about the external world?

Moods are not about the external world: they are about oneself or they are just a subjective feeling.

Mendelovici's Projectivism: Moods do not have necessarily have objects. We project emotional qualities into the world. Moods represent unbound evaluative properties.

3. Can Intentionality explain Phenomenal Consciousness?

The promise of representationalism.

Intentionality First or Consciousness First?

3.1. Representationalism

The claim: Phenomenality is explained by intentionality. Phenomenality is intentionality (strong), Phenomenality depends on intentionality (weak).

Kinds of representationalism: content vs. mode, internalism vs. externalism

Tye's reductive, strong, pure, externalist representationalism: non-conceptual content explains phenomenality

The argument of transparency

3.2. Problems for Representationalism

3.2.1. Aspect perception and Gestalt (McPherson): same content, different feel

3.2.3. Unconscious representations: Blindsight is unconscious vision. Intentionality is not sufficient for phenomenality. Unconscious representations have content but no phenomenology. Also the cases of aphantasia and zombies (Chalmers).

3.2.3. Externalist worries. Mismatch between tracking theories of content and phenomenal character. Going internalist? Block: intentional properties are wide/external, phenomenal properties are narrow/internal, hence they differ.

3.3. Consciousness First Approaches

3.3.1. Searle's view: Consciousness - not intentionality - is the mark of the mental. How are we to accommodate unconscious mental states (dispositional, subpersonal states, etc.). The Connection Principle.

3.3.2. Phenomenal Intentionality: Consciousness confers intentionality. But again what about unconscious representations? The indirect intentionality move. What about judgments: are they phenomenally conscious?

3.3.3. Cognitive Phenomenology: Thoughts and judgments are phenomenally conscious. Their phenomenology is not reducible to sensory phenomenology. In rescue of Phenomenal Intentionality. Is there non-reducible cognitive phenomenology? The argument for understanding. The argument of pure cognitive phenomenology.

3.4. Intentionality First or Consciousness First? Unconscious states are problematic for both. Chalmers's two-dimensional, non-reductive representationalism. Block's dual aspects of the mind. Intentionality and consciousness are intertwined, maybe none is more fundamental than the other.

aula adiada

25 Outubro 2022, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

Devido à participação do docente num congresso, esta aula foi adiada. Será substituída por uma aula adicional no dia 15.12.2022.

module Language (2)

18 Outubro 2022, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

Continuation of Frege's semantic theory: compositionality and substitutivity; the distinction between sense and reference; puzzles about proper names.

The problem of reference failure and introduction to Russell's theory of definite descriptions.

module Language (1)

11 Outubro 2022, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

Overview of Frege's semantic theory: functional analysis and its applications to logical connectives, predicates and quantifiers. Mini course of basic Logic.