Module A: Mind (4)

4 Outubro 2022, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

Why is Intentionality important? Naturalization, the mark of the mental, and consciousness.

2.4. Kinds of content

2.4.1. Propositional vs. Non-propositional content

Propositional attitudes (belief, desire) vs. Objectual attitudes (admiration, love, thinking, etc.). That-clauses vs. Object complement.

Borderline cases: Some mental states can be either propositional or objectual (perception, memory, imagination; Dretske on simple seeing; cognitive penetration).

What is the distinction?

The naive contrast: Object.

Propositional attitudes are about propositions (vs. objectual attitudes are about objects).

The problem of propositional attitudes about states of affairs (vs. propositions).

The problem of objectual attitudes about propositions (vs. objects): loving/hating propositions (Grzankowski).

The refined contrast: Object vs. Content. 

Propositional attitudes have propositional content (vs. objectual attitudes). Counterexamples accommodated.

Propositional content admits of satisfaction/truth conditions. Consequently, propositional attitudes can be true/false, satisfied/unsatisfied. 

Objects can't be true/false, satisfied/unsatisfied. Therefore, objectual attitudes are not assessable for truth/satisfaction/accuracy.

Doubts about that... See lecture on emotions' correctness conditions.

Varieties of intentional content

·  Propositional vs. Objectual content

·  Interrogative content (curiosity, Carruthers; interrogative attitudes, Friedman)

·  Imperative content (desire, Archer)

4.2. Conceptual vs. Non-conceptual content

The contrast

Propositional attitudes and conceptual content. Intuition, individuation of content, generality constraint (Evans).

Experiences, animal/infant cognition and non-conceptual content. Definition of non-conceptual content.

Is there non-conceptual content?

Kant/McDowell vs. Peacocke

Argument 1: The waterfall illusion and impossible figures (Crane, Mellor).

Argument 2: Fineness of grain of experiences. Evans/Peacocke and the fine shades of redness. McDowell's demonstrative concepts reply and its limits.

Argument 3: Peacocke's ontogenesis of observational/phenomenal concepts.

Argument 4: Continuities with infant and animal cognition (Schellenberg).

Controversies regarding the nature of concepts. Concepts and discriminatory abilities (Carey). Non-human animals and generality constraint (Carruthers). Peacocke's reflective requirement on concepts.

2.5. The naturalization program (or why is intentionality important I)

2.5.1. The program

The mind within a naturalistic framework.

Tracking theories of intentionality/representations.

Progress in philosophy.

2.5.2. Dretske's informational semantics

Content as what the representation is supposed to indicate.

Compasses and nomic covariation.

Analogy with beliefs.

2.5.3. Millikan's teleosemantics

Content determined by proper function.

Content as environmental condition that needs to be met in order for the representation to perform its proper function

The case of beliefs: beliefs are about conditions that needs to be met for the belief to be true (function of representing the world).

Evolutionary functions vs. Intentional selection (artefacts, language, social facts, ...)

The centrality of dysfunction and functions

2.5.4. Problems

Brain in a vat. Mismatches between experiences and properties (bitterness, Pautz). Non-causal content (fiction, mathematics, impossible figures). 

3. Is Intentionality the mark of the mental? (or why is intentionality important II)

3.1. What is the claim?

X is a mental state if and only if it is intentional. Venn diagram.

Are all mental states intentional? Are all representations mental?

Some mental states are not intentional: moods, pain and bodily feelings (Searle).

Some representations are not mental (linguistic representations, maps, artefacts, artistic representations). Yet they have derived intentionality (Searle, Millikan); mental representations have original intentionality.

3.2. The case of pain

3.2.1. Is pain intentional?

Pain is not intentional: linguistic intuition and Aydede.

Pain is intentional: it is directed at the body. 

The argument of felt location and qualities of pain (Cutter). Pains feel located and instantiate qualities (intensity, duration, kinds of pain, etc.). Therefore, pain represents qualities as instantiated in the body.

3.2.2. Desiderata for a theory of the intentionality of pain

What is the content of pain, exactly?

3 dimensions of pain. 1. Sensory-discriminative (location). 2. Affective (unpleasantness, valence). 3. Motivational (pain avoidance). Typical cases (exceptions).

3.2.2. Pain as perception of bodily damage.

Armstrong: (i) perception and (ii) damage (physical disorder).

Virtues: content and function; location; qualitative features (Tye).

Problems for the bodily damage view

1.    Phenomenology (Crane). Pain does not feel that way. Tye and non-conceptual content.

2.    Intensity and mismatch (Coninx). Felt intensity does not correspond to severity/magnitude of the damage. Psychological dimensions on pain intensity (e.g. expectations, contexts, ...).

3.    Lack of causal correlations and of dysfunction (Coninx). The view predicts that causal correlations should be rare and dysfunctional. But misrepresentations are plenty and are not dysfunctional: intensity, chronic pain, muscle pain, menstruation pain, etc.

4.    Affective dimension. The view doesn't capture the unpleasantness of pain. One can perceive (e.g. see) physical damage without feeling pain (Bain).

3.2.3. The mode of hurting (Crane)

Content and mode.

Pain and content: parts of body.

Pain and mode of hurting. Pain (x): represent x (part of body/CONTENT) as hurting (MODE)

Virtues: intensity captured by mode; seeing pain isn't pain (different mode).

Problem: Some pains don't hurt! Pain asymbolia: they feel pain without emotional, behavioral dispositions characteristic of typical pain. They feel a pain that doesn't hurt. Sensory vs. Affective dimensions of pain.

SUGGESTED READINGS (in the moodle):

Christopher Peacocke, 2001, "Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?"

Tim Crane, 2009, "Intentionalism"

 

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Module A: Mind (3)

27 Setembro 2022, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

2. The structure of intentional states (continued)

2.2. Intentional Content

2.2.2.2. Intentional content as success conditions (Searle).

·  The application to mind and the faces of success (veridicality, truth, correctness, satisfaction, fulfilment).

·  The application to speech acts: assertion, order, promises.

·  Mental content that is not success conditions (imagination, emotion, expressives). Belief-desire theory of emotion.

·  Intentional content in brief.

2.3. Intentional modes.

What are intentional modes? What is the distinction between the Belief (that p) and the Desire (that p)?

2.3.1. Intentional modes as functional roles.

·  The functional roles of belief and desire: representing vs. acting

·  Direction of fit (Anscombe): shopping list vs. detective report

·  Speech acts: word-to-world vs. world-to-word direction of fit

·  Mind: mind-to-world vs. world-to-mind direction of fit

·  Complications: Null direction of fit of imagination and emotion (Searle); Representations with both directions of fit (Millikan on honeybee dances, Searle on declarations, Schueler on hope)

·  How to interpret the metaphor? Smith on functionalist interpretation. The problem of imagination (Velleman) and hope (Schueler). Skepticism about direction of fit. Alternative interpretations. Humberstone and implicit norms of belief/desire-formation.

2.3.2. Modes as representational guises.

·  Modes, first-person style (Brentano, Kriegel).

·  Aquinas on representational guises: belief and the guise of the truth, desire and the guise of the good.

·  The guise of the good. Arguments from intelligibility conditions (Anscombe) and Radioman (Quinn)

·  Is the guise of the good thesis true?

·  Kinds of mental states and representational guises: phenomenological exercise. 

·  The power and importance of the tripartite structure of intentional states

2.4. Kinds of mental content

2.4.1. Propositional vs. Non-propositional content

Propositional attitudes (belief, desire) vs. Objectual attitudes (admiration, love, thinking, etc.)

SUGGESTED READING: Tim Crane, 1998, Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental (the article is in the folder on moodle).

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Module A: Mind (2)

20 Setembro 2022, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

1. Introduction to the Mind module (end)

·  The two facets of the mind: intentionality and phenomenality

·  Terminology

·  Import

·  The four blocks

2. Intentionality and Representation: The Basic Framework

2.1. The Intuition

2.1.1. What is intentionality and representation? An intuitive exercise.

2.1.2. Aboutness/Directedness: concept and terminology

2.1.2. History: Franz Brentano

2.2. The structure of intentional states: object, content, and mode.

2.2.1. Object - Content - Mode: John Searle, Tim Crane.

2.2.2. Intentional objects, directedness, and inexistence. Crane.

2.2.2. Intentional content

2.2.2.1. Content and aspectual shape. The importance of mental content.

2.2.2.2. What is content? Content as accuracy conditions (Susanna Siegel). Content as satisfaction/success conditions (Searle).

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Module A: Mind (1)

13 Setembro 2022, 14:00 • Ricardo Santos

1. Who are we? 

2. The Course: Structure, schedule, language, assessment, and logistics.

3. Introduction to the Mind module

·  Folk psychology and introspective exercise

·  What are mental states? Mental states qua mental states vs. Mind-Body problem.

·  Some intuitions, especially consciousness

·  Methodology: Testing an identity claim with the tool of necessary and sufficient conditions

·  The main players: Intentionality/Representation and Phenomenality/Consciousness as the two main facets of the mind

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